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Frans von der Dunk
Contradictio in terminis or Realpolitik?
A Qualified Plea for a Role of 'Soft Law' in the Context
of Space Activities
I. The issue of 'soft law' in the context of space activities
The ongoing globalisation oflaw and legal developments and the increasing di-
vetsity of actors, stake-holders and interest-holders in the international com-
munity over roughly the last seven decades has - amongst many other things
- put considerable pressure on the traditional perception of 'law' and its role in
the international community.
As will be argued, the more targeted discussions on 'soft law', whether it exists
and if so what it means, form a specific component thereof. 'Soft law' instru-
ments in this context could for instance 'purport to specifY rules of conduct, but
do not emanate from the traditional "sources" of public international law' 1 - a
definition illustrating in a very clear manner the internal contradiction in the
concept which will be shown to be at the core of the discussions about its exist-
ence and viability. Moreover, the issue, is not a merely academic one anymore,
and for a variety of reasons the above is probably even more true in the area of
space activities. It is also from this perspective that many analyses have addressed
the Werdegang of space law from the dawn of the space age onwards. 2
Steven Freeland, The Role of 'Soft Law' in Public International Law and its Relevance to the
International Legal Regulation of Outer Space, supra, 19 (emphasis added).
2 Cf. e.g. Vladlen Vereshchetin, The Law of Outer Space in the General Legal Field (Commonal-
ity and Particularities), Proceedings of the 52,,1 Colloquium on the Law of Outer Space 2009
(2010) 3; Stephan Hohe, The Relevance of Current International Space Treaties in the 2l"
Century, XXVII Annals of Air and Space Law (2002) 335; Glenn Harlan Reynolds, Space
Law in its Second Half-Century, 31 Journal of Space Law (2005) 413; Peter Jankowitsch,
The Role of the United Nations in Outer Space Law Development: Past Achievements and
New Challenges, 26 Journal of Space Law (1998) 101 ; Gabriel Lafferranderie, Basic principles
Governing the Use of Outer Space in Future Perspective, in: Marietta Benko and Kai-Uwe
Schrogl (eds.), Space law: current problems and perspectives fOr future regulation (2005) 7 et
seq.; also already the present author's The Undeniably Necessary Cradle - Out of Principle
and Ultimately Out of Sense, in: Gabriel Lafferranderie (ed.), Outlook on Space Law over the
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In terms of space law, so the story goes, it all started with a handful of inter-
nal administrative and/or non-legally binding United Nations General Assembly
resolutions berween 1958 and 1963, such as Resolutions 1348 (XIII)3 and 1472
(XIV)4 establishing the Committee on the Peaceful Use of Outer Space (UN-
COPUOS) firstly as an ad hoc, then as a permanent committee, and Resolutions
1721 (XVI)B,5 1962 (XVIII)6 and 1963 (XVIII) setting out some principles to
be adhered to in the conduct of space activities.
A next phase, roughly encompassing the second half of the sixties and the first
half of the seventies, saw the establishment of a handful of binding instruments:
multilateral treaties, developed in the bosom ofUNCOPUOS. The first four of
those treaties - the 1967 Outer Space Treaty,? the 1968 Rescue Agreement,S
Next 30 }Cars, Essays published for the 30th Anniversary of the Outer Space Treaty (Kluwer
Law International, The Hague 1997) 401; Jean-Louis van de Wouwer and Fran<;:ois Lambert,
European trajectories in space law (European Commission, Luxembourg et al. 2007) 19-72.
3 Question of the peaceful use of outer space, GA Res 1348 (XIll) of 13 December 1958;
Resolutions adopted on the reports of the First Committee, General Assembly - Thirteenth
Session, at 5.
4 International co-operation in the peaceful uses of outer space, GA Res 1472 (XIV) A of 12
December 1959; Resolutions adopted on the reports of the First Committee, General Assem-
bly - Fourteenth Session, at 5.
5 GA Res 1721 (XVI) B of20 December 1961; General Assembly - Sixteenth Session, Resolu-
tions adopted on reports of the First Committee, at 6.
6 Declaration of Legal Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and
Use of Outer Space, GA Res 1962 (XVIll) of 13 December 1963; United Nations Doc. A/
AC.I 05/572/Rev.I, at 37.
7 Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer
Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (hereafter Outer Space 'Ii~eaty), Lon-
don/Moscow/Washington, done 27 January 1967, entered into force 10 October 1967; 610
UNTS 205; TIAS 6347; 18 UST 2410; UKTS 1968 No. 10; Cmnd. 3198; ATS 1967 No.
24; 6 ILM 386 (1967). As of the moment of writing, the Outer Space Treaty has 100 States
Parties in addition to 26 Signatory States.
8 Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts and the Return of Objects
Launched into Outer Space (hereafter Rescue Agreement), London/Moscow/Washington,
done 22 April 1968, entered into force 3 December 1968; 672 UNTS 119; TIAS 6599; 19
UST 7570; UKTS 1969 No. 56; Cmnd. 3786; ATS 1986 No.8; 7ILM 151 (1968). As of
the moment ofwriting, the Rescue Agreement has 92 States Parties in addition to 24 Signatory
States.
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the 1972 Liability Convention9 and the 1975 Registration Convention10 - were to
enjoy widespread, almost universal adherence, especially (in particular with reference
to the Registration Convention with its considerably lower overall number of States
Parties) where it concerned those States active in or with regard to outer space.
A number of authors also considered the 1963 Partial Test Ban Treaty! 1 to be
part of this core corpus juris spatialis, even though the treaty did not only concern
the area of outer space but also the Earth's atmosphere and the oceans. Moreo-
ver, though enjoying ratification by a large group of nations, soon key States
becoming threshold or near-nuclear powers turned out to not be amongst those
nations raising major concerns regarding relevance and status of the legal regime
as such. Meanwhile the development of a new, Comprehensive Test Ban Treatyl2
has caused the legal situation to become even more complicated in this context,
so these treaties will not be further taken into consideration.
In any event, the last truly multilateral treaty to arise out of United Nations-
level negotiations and UNCOPUOS, the 1979 Moon Agreementl3 , turned
9 Convention on International Liability fot Damage Caused by Space Objects (hereafter Li-
ability Convention), London/Moscow/Washington, done 29 March 1972, entered into force
1 September 1972; 961 UNTS 187; T1AS 7762; 24 UST 2389; UKTS 1974 No. 16; Cmnd.
5068; ATS 1975 No.5; 10 1LM 965 (1971). As of the moment of writing, the Liability Con-
vention has 90 States Parties in addition to 23 Signatory Stares.
10 Convention on Registrarion of Objects Launched into Outer Space (hereafter Registration
Convention), New York, done 14 January 1975, entered into force 15 September 1976; 1023
UNTS 15; TIAS 8480; 28 UST 695; UKTS 1978 No. 70; Cmnd. 6256; ATS 1986 No.5;
14 1LM 43 (1975). As of the moment of writing, the Registration Convention has 55 States
Parties in addition to 4 Signatory States.
11 Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water
(hereafter Partial Test Ban Treaty), Moscow, done 5 August 1963, entered into force 10 Oc-
tober 1963; 480 UNTS 43; TIAS 5433; 14 UST 1313; UKTS 1964 No.3; ATS 1963 No.
26. As of the moment of writing, according to the US State Department's website (http://
www.state.gov/r/isn/4797.htm; pages 7-9) the Partial Test Ban Tteaty has 117 States Parties
(94 having ratified, 23 having acceded to the treaty) in addition to 11 Signatory States. For
completeness' sake, it should be added that the United Kingdom and Russia are the two other
depositary States; theit respective lists should, but may not exactly, match the list ptovided by
the United States as depositary.
12 Comprehensive Test Ban Tteaty, New York, done 24 September 1996, not yet entered into
force; 35 ILM 1439 (1996); S. Treaty Doc. No.1 05-28 (1997). As of the moment of writ-
ing, 154 States have tatified the treaty whereas 28 States have signed bur not (yet) ratified it.
13 Agteement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Othet Celestial Bodies (hete-
after Moon Agteement), New York, done 18 December 1979, entered into force 11 July 1984;
1363 UNTS 3; ATS 1986 No. 14; 18 ILM 1434 (1979).
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our to fail precisely to achieve any measure of ratification by major space-faring
States, causing most of the non-space-faring States at the time to also not bother
with ratification. Whilst the number of ratifications over the last years has gone
up slightly, it still remains at only 13 thirteen to this day - and none of the rati-
fYing States could be called a major space power. 14
As a consequence of the lack of further probabilities, presumed apparent from
the failure of the Moon Agreement, that the international community would
ever be able to arrive at another treaty on outer space enjoying widespread ac-
ceptance, a third era was seen to come abour, where resort was once more taken
to such non-binding legal instruments as United Nations resolurions - major
examples thereof being Resolutions 37/92,15 41/65,16 47/68 17 and 51/122. 18
This development has been lamented in particular by a number of authors, 19
and criticised for its non-binding character which threatened to create more con-
fusion as to what the legal rights and obligations of relevant players were and/or
should be, instead of hoped-for clarity regarding the direction the legal regime
14 cr e.g. Freeland, supra, 16; Ram Jakhu, Stephan Hobe and Steven Freeland, 111e Appropriate-
ness of the Moon Agreement for Lunar Exploration and Use, Proceedings of the International
Institute of Space Law (2011) 562-8; Fabio Tronchetti, the Exploitation ofNatural Resourees of
the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies. A ProposalfOr a Legal Regime (Martinus NijhoffPublishers,
Leiden-Boston 2009) esp. 38 et seq.; the author's The Moon Agreement and the Prospect of
Commercial Exploitation of Lunar Resources, XXXII Annals of Air and Space Law (2007) 91.
15 Principles Governing the Use by States of Artificial Earth Satellites for International Direct
Television Broadcasting, GA Res. 37/92 of 10 December 1982; United Nations Doc. AI
AC.l 05/572/Rev.1, at 39.
16 Principles Relating to Remote Sensing of the Earth from Outer Space, GA Res. 41/65 of 3
December 1986; United Nations Doc. A/ACI 05/572/Rev.l, at 43; 25 ILM 1334 (1986).
17 Principles Relevant to the Use of Nuclear Power Sources in Outer Space, GA Res. 47/68 of 14
December 1992; United Nations Doc. AlACI 05/572/Rev.!, at 47.
18 Declaration on International Cooperation in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space for the
Benefit and in the Interest of all States, Taking into Particular Account the Needs of Developing
Countries, GA Res. 51/122 of 13 December 1996; United Nations Doc. A/RES/51/122.
19 See Vereshchetin, supra fn 2, 8-9; Stephan Hobe, Historical Background, in: Stephan Hobe,
Bernhard Schmidt-Tedd and Kai-Uwe Schrogl (eds.), Cologne Commentary on Space Law,
Volume 1 - (Juter SprlCe Treaty (Carl Heymanns Verlag, Koln 2009) 15-6; Jose Monserrat
Filho and Alvaro Fabricio dos Santos, Is there a Future for Space Law beyond "Soft Law"?,
Proceedings of the International Institute of Space Law 2010 (2011) 234 et seq., summarising
part of the discussion inter alia by reference to such authors; further e.g. Vereshchetin, esp. 5,
8 et seq.; Hohe supra fn. 2, 339-40; Lafferranderie, supra fn 2, esp. 19-20. Making a case for
United Nations resolutions as effectively a form of soft law with its own advantages as compared
to 'hard' treaty law by contrast is Nandasiri Jasntuliyana, Treaty Law and Outer Space: Can
the United Nations Play an Effective Role?, XI Annals of Air and Space Law (1986) 219.
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of outer space was developing. Though perhaps undersrandable, even unavoid-
able in view of the growing number and diversity of actors and stake-holders in
outer space and space activities, it was considered a major step backwards. After
a 'golden era' of achieving near-global agreement on clear and binding legal re-
gimes by means of the space treaties, apparently the best the international com-
munity could now come up with were non-binding sets of guidelines - some
of them of a rather limited purport, too. A main example of the latter of course
was Resolution 47/68, providing as it did rather technical guidelines for the safe
handling of nuclear power sources in space adventures.
It is in this context in particular, that concepts such as 'customary interna-
tionallaw' (as a means for interpreting per se non-binding documents in such
a manner that they would after all contain some legally binding rules) and 'soft
law' (as a status perceived to be in between legal rules which need to be obeyed
and non-legal rules which legally speaking can be disregarded) became heavily
discussed, almost as an effort to fill the gaps left by the inability to agree on a
world-wide scale on further treary regimes.
Also the present book contains several contributions undertaking analyses of
these phenomena,2o which is why the present contribution has chosen another
angle of approach. This chapter namely takes a step back, almost outside of the
realm of law itself, in order to take a fresh look at those debates on whether 'soft
law' exists and, if so what it is - and then of course come back to the main
question posed here as to whether it would be a useful or on the contrary coun-
terproductive notion from the perspective of furthering the cause of space law.
II. The characteristics of 'law' and '(international) space law'
Whenever the role of 'soft law' is discussed in the context of space activities, it
is usually the public international body of space law which is addressed, at heart
still part of the larger body of public international law. True, with the extending
20 See e.g. Sreven Freeland, The Role of 'Soft Law' in Public Inrernational Law and its Relevance
to the International Legal Regulation of Outer Space, supra 19-28; Brian Lepard, 1be Legal
Status of the 1996 Declaration on Space Benefits: Are Its Norms Now Part of Customary
International Law?, infra, 291-294; Setsuo Aoki, The Function of 'Soft Law' in the Develop-
ment of International Law, infra, 57-85, especially 61 If. For a more general analysis of the
concept of customary law, see also Brian Lepard, Customary International Law.' A New Jhem)
with Practical Applications (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 20 10).
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role of intergovernmental cooperation in outer space and the increasing priva-
tisation of space activities, 'internal' institutional arrangements respectively do-
mestic private law may continuously gain in importance.
Yet, those more novel legal 'systems' are still fundamentally contingent upon
the public corpus juris spatialis internationalis, most notably through such con-
cepts as State responsibility,21 State liability for damage caused by space objects,22
and jurisdiction over space objects specifically through their registration by one
State or another.23 In other words: States are still, certainly in legal terms, the key
factors in space law. This also continues to justify addressing the issue of soft law
in such a public international law-context in particular.
Public international law in its turn is of course part of the comprehensive body
of all law, and here it should be noted that 'law' usually is considered a social con-
struct, one social tool among others for helping to hold a society of humans to-
gether in a meaningful manner. It distinguishes itself from other such social con-
structs - ranging from religion to currency, from social and political norms to a
common (sense of) history - by its formality and consequent relative precision
and objectivity, incorporating its own system for adaptation and change of itself,
and working through concepts that in principle everyone within such a society is
subjected to, that normally most within that society subscribe to for the major part
and that can, in one way or another, be enforced against those that may not wish
to be subjected or subscribe to it at a certain point in time - in short: 'hard' law.
This is probably also why lawyers, including space lawyers, with a view to
confident argumentation in first instance tend to attach greatest value to clearly
phrased and written rules of law, and might often not be very sympathetic to
the possibility of the existence of 'grey' areas where it would be rather uncertain
whether such rules are binding or not, where the legal value would not simply be
'0' or' l' but might well be vacillating somewhere in between.
21 Cf. Art. VI Outer Space Treaty, providing for international responsibility inter alia for space
activities 'carried on [... J by non-governmental entities' and consequently requiring 'the ap-
propriate State' ro exercise 'authorization and continuing supervision'.
22 Cf. Art. VII Outer Space Treaty, jointly with Arts. l(c), ll-V Liability Convention, providing
for liability for damage caused by space objects exclusively through the concept of 'the launch-
ing State'.
23 See Art. V111 Outer Space Treaty, jointly with Art. II, Registration Convention. By means
of those provisions, a fundamental right for a State to exercise jurisdiction over registered
spacecraft and their personnel is added to the 'traditional' accepted bases for exercising State
jurisdiction, notably of territoriality of events at issue and of nationality of those entities or
persons responsible for them.
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Within this general conception of 'law' as a social construct public interna-
tionallaw, including space law, concerns a body of law which distinguishes itself
from other bodies of law through a number of features elsewhere discussed in
much more precision and legal detail, but essentially amounting to the follow-
ing.
Firstly, in line with the public character already noted briefly, public interna-
tionallaw is a body oflaw dealing with issues involving various States. Tradition-
ally, States even were the only subjects of public international law, but especially
since World War II in many cases international intergovernmental organisations,
companies and individual persons also acquired a measure of legal personality
in the international field. Still, and in spite of the fact that this may not always
be representative of political or economic reality, this concerns generally limited
manifestations of international legal personality; States remain the only interna-
tionallaw subjects across the whole spectrum of public international law. As a re-
sult, in many respects, the rights (and duties) of other actors in the international
arena are still taken care of in legal terms through one State or another.
In space law specifically this is even more true due to the military and stra-
tegic considerations almost always prominently present in the context of space
activities, the benefits from outer space ventures which were for a long time con-
sidered to be either in that realm or in the scientific one, as well as the size of
costs and risks involved in going into outer space. Those factors, at least for the
first few decades, caused space activities essentially to be beyond the reach of
private enterprise - and even beyond the reach of many individual nations,
causing them in some cases to cooperate together through international, more
or less institutional (but certainly still public) constructs such as the interna-
tional satellite operators INTELSAT24 and INMARSAT,25 and the European
24 Following the realisation of an interim-organisation, INTELSAT properly was established as
an international public consortium in 1971 by means of the Agreement Relating to the In-
ternational Telecommunications Satellite Organisation (lNTELSAT), Washington, done 20
] 9~1, entered into force 12 February 1973; 1220 UNTS 21; TIAS 7532; 23 UST
3813; UKTS 1973 No. 80; Cmnd. 4799; ATS 1973 No.6; 10 ILM 909 (1971); and the
Operating Agreement Relating to the International Telecommunications Satellite Organisa-
tion (INTELSAT), Washington, done 20 August 1971, entered into force 12 February 1973;
1220 UNTS 149; TIAS 7532; 23 UST 4091 ; UKTS 1973 No. 80; Cmnd. 4799; ATS 1973
No.6; 10 ILM 946 (1971). Of course, more recently INTELSAT was privatised, causing a
rump-lGO INTELSAT to co-exist side by side with a private operator Intelsat.
25 INMARSAT was established as another international public satellite operating consortium in
1976 by means of the Convention on the International Maritime Satellite Organisation (IN-
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Space Agency (ESA).2G The resulting and - in spite of the developments men-
tioned - still persisting key role of States in space activities was of course also
reflected fundamentally in the corpus juris spatialis. Ihe Outer Space Treaty refers
to 'non-governmental entities' just once,27 and to intergovernmental organisa-
tions only as vehicles for international cooperation of sovereign States. 2B None
of the space treaties following the Outer Space Treaty refers in any more detail
to 'non-governmental entities', and though intergovernmental organisations
have been granted a certain legal possibility to become 'quasi-parties' to those
treaties,29 these possibilities (a) are limited to the material clauses of the treaty
at issue and do not encompass for example the right to propose amendments;
(b) are subject to the requirement that the individual member States of such an
organisation can always be held responsible in conformity with Art. VI of the
Outer Space Treaty if the organisation itself fails to appropriately answer to such
responsibility; and in the case of the Liability Convention (c) exclude the pos-
sibility for direct claims by an intergovernmental organisation whilst allowing
claimants against such an organisation to address the individual member States
in case the organisation itself fails to rapidly solve the claim. 50
MARSAT), London, done 3 Septembet 1976, entered into force 16 July 1979; 1143 UNTS
105; TIAS 9605; 31 UST I; UKTS 1979 No. 94; Cmnd. 6822; ATS 1979 No. 10; 15 ILM
1052 (1976); and the Opetating Agreement on the International Maritime Satellite Organisa-
tion (lNMARSAT), London, done 3 September 1976, entered into force 16 July 1979; 1143
UNTS 213; TIAS 9605; 31 UST 1; UKTS 1979 No. 94; Cmnd. 6822; ATS 1979 No.1 0;
15 ILM 233, 1075 (1976). Like INTELSAT, INMARSAT was privatised latet on, resulting in
a rump-ICO INMARSAT and a private opetator Inmarsar.
26 ESA was created by the Convention fot the Establishment of a European Space Agency (here-
after [SA Convention), Paris, done 30 May 1975, enteted into force 30 October 1980; 14
ILM 864 (1975); Space Law - EtlSic Legal Documents, Cr.I.
27 In An. VI Outer Space Treaty; see also supra, fir 21.
28 C:f An. VI Outer Space Treaty, making member States of an intergovernmental organisation
active in ourer space responsible for those activities rather than the organisation itselt~ and An.
XIlI, Ourer Space Treaty, which refers to such organisations as a 'framework' within which the
States concerned carry out space activities.
29 cr An. 6 Rescue Agreement; Art. XXII Liability Convenrion; Art. VII Registration Conven-
tion; and Art. 16 Moon Agreemenr.
30 See Art. XXlI (3) Liability Convention, which provides: 'Ifan international intergovernmental
organization is liable for damage by virtue of the provisions of this Convention, that organiza-
tion and those of its members which are States Parties to this Convention shall be jointly and
severally liable; provided, however, that: (a) Any claim for compensation in respect of such
damage shall be first presented to the organization; (b) Only where the organization has not
paid, within a period of six months, any slim agreed or determined to be due as compensation
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Secondly, in many respects, general public international law has often been
considered a rather rudimentary and 'immature' or embryonic legal system, caus-
ing some even to question it is truly law in the first place. The arguments support-
ing such statements usually focus on the general absence of a global adjudicative
system (even the World Court essentially depending upon individual parties to a
dispute for being entitled to exerciseiurisdiction.l1) and, even more, an effective
enforcement regime (the United Nations Security Council, the closest thing to an
international policeman, being entitled to act with force against unwilling mem-
ber States only in rather restricted circumstances, as further compromised by the
political reality of superpower vetoesJ2). Since the general rules of public interna-
tionallaw, including the United Nations Charter, are considered to be applicable
also to outer space (unless under the lex specialis derogat lex generalis principle
specific and different space law provisions would be pertinent) these considera-
tions would also automatically apply to the corpus juris spatialis internationalis.J.l
for such damage, may the claimant State invoke the liability of the members which are States
Parties to this Convention for the payment of that sum.'
31 Cf. the famous jurisdictional clause of Art. 36 Statute of the International Court of Justice
(hereafter IC] Statute), San Francisco, done 26 June 1945, entered into force 24 October 1945;
156 UNTS 77; USTS 993; 59 Stat. 1031; lIKTS 1946 No. 67; AI'S 1945 No.1: '1. The ju-
risdiction of the Court comprises all cases which the parties refer to it and all matters speCially
provided for in the Charter of the United Nations or in treaties and conventions in force. 2. The
states parties to the present Statute may at any time declare that they recognize as compulsory
ipso facto and without special agreement, in relation to any other state accepting the same ob-
ligation, the jurisdiction of the Court in all legal disputes concerning: a. the interpretation of
a (reaty; b. any question of international law; c. the existence of any fact which, if established,
would constiture a breach of an international obligation; d. the nature or extent of the repara-
tion to be made for the breach of an international obligation. 3. "Ihc declarations referred to
above may be made unconditionally or on condition of reciprocity on the part of several or
certain states, or for a certain time.' In addition, the so-called ftrum prorogatum concept allows
the ICJ to entertain jurisdierion once parties are seen to have silently accepted such jurisdierion
through asserting arguments on the merits of a dispute before the court.
32 See esp. Arts. 39-42 Charter of the United Nations (hereafter United Nations Charter), San
Francisco, done 26 June 1945, entered into force 24 October 1945; USTS 993; 24 LIST
2225; 59 Stat. 1031 ; 145 UKTS 805; UKTS 1946 No. 67; Cmd. 6666 & 6711 ; CTS 1945
No.7; AI'S 1945 No. I.
33 See of course especially Art. III Outer Space Treaty, which transfers this assumption into an
explicit and official part of space law. Thus, whenever specific space law provides for insuf-
ficiently clear or disputed legal rules, or whenever it does not provide for any legal guidance
at all, reference should be had to general public international law to solve a particular issue or
dispute.
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More to the point, the embryonic nature of public international law means
that its main subjects - the States - can still largely determine individually
which part of that legal order to accept and live by. In their sovereignty, they can
choose to sign and ratifY a particular treaty - or refuse to do so; treaty law of
course being one of the two major recognised and accepted sources of interna-
tionallaw. 34
In terms of space law specifically, the discussions regarding the terms of the
Moon Agreement are quite illuminating in this regard. The major novelty of
the Moon Agreement as compared to the previous space treaties developed in
UNCOPUOS was its insistence on the Moon and its natural resources being
'the common heritage of mankind', 35 as presumably different from the concept
of the 'province of all mankind' which the Outer Space Treaty's Article I makes
reference to.
Whilst the precise terms of what the 'common heritage of mankind' in the
context of lunar exploration and exploitation was to mean had yet to be worked
out, with an eye to roughly parallel developments in the context of the law of
the sea and the ocean floor States and legal experts alike commonly understood
the concept to refer to some form of obligatory revenue-sharing and technology
transfers,36 which caused most States, including all major space powers, to ab-
stain from ratifYingY
In the light of the widespread failure to ratifY the Moon Agreement, staunch
supporters of the 'common heritage of mankind' idea would then come up with
arguments that, independently from the treaty text, the concept would be bind-
34 See Art. 38 (I) lit a Ie] Statute; with Art. 38 as such, as Freeland, supra, at 13-15, correctly
observed, widely being understood as reflecting the sources of public international law in gen-
eral terms (as opposed to just for the purpose of solving a case before the IC]).
35 Art. 11 (I) Moon Agreement.
36 'The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Montego Bay, done 10 December
1982, entered into force 16 November 1994; 1833 UNTS 3 & 1835 UNTS 261 ; UKTS 1999
No. 81; Cmnd. 8941; ATS 1994 No. 31; 21 ILM 1261 (1982); S. Treaty Doc. No. 103-39;
in its Part XI contained a rather elaborate scheme for revenue-sharing and technology transfers
in the context of exploiting the ocean floor, involving international entities to be created such
as 1be Authority and The Enterprise.
37 For a more extended analysis of these issues, cf especially Tronchetti, supra fn 14, 38-61 ; also
Henry Hertzfeld and Frans von der Dunk, Bringing Space Law into the Commercial World:
Property Rights without Sovereignty, 6 Chicago Journal of International Law (2005) 81; the
author's The Moon Agreement and the Prospect of Commercial Exploitation of Lunar Re-
sources, XXXII Annals of Air and Space Law (2007) 91.
Contradictio in terminis or Realpolitik? 41
ing upon all as customary law or even as jus cogens (a special concepr to be fur-
ther addressed below).
As far as the treaty itself was concerned, however, legal analysis clearly could
and did come to only one conclusion. As much as in the context of the preced-
ing UNCOPUOS discussions the States refusing adherence had not indicated
any strong antagonism (otherwise UNCOPUOS would never have been able to
arrive at an agreed draft text in the first place!), the primordial sovereign right of
States to change their minds prevailed. This sovereignty, entitling them to deter-
mine for themselves which treaties to adhere to and which not, could only mean
that refusing States could not in any measure consider to be bound by whatever
the Moon Agreement provided above and beyond what was already in the other
space treaties, general international law and had obtained the status of 'custom-
ary international law' as applicable to those States.
That brings discussion to the other major source ofinternationallaw,38 where
things are somewhat more complicated. From an outside perspective 'custom-
ary international law' is not so much a source or body of law arising through a
clear and formal process as characterises treaty law, but a label stuck by relevant
Stares and at least a majority of international law experts on developments hap-
pening in political, economic, social and other non-legal terms. 39 Such labels are
accorded on the basis of an analysis of these developments as recast in terms of
'State practice' and'opinio juris', and thus almost inevitably involve a far greater
measure of insecurity - read subjectivity - than treaty law as to whether a cer-
tain legal rule exists or not. 40 Still, similarly to treaty law, States can through their
own 'practice' and opinio juris essentially determine which purported rules of
customary international law they choose to abide by, respecively refuse to abide
by, for example by becoming 'persistent objectors'.
With regard to the discussion on customary law specifically in the context
of space law the developments concerning United Nations Resolution 41/65,
containing the principles on remote sensing, are particularly illustrative. The
38 Cf Art. 38(l.b) Ie] Statute; see also supra, fn 34.
39 See also the extended analysis of customary international law in general in Brian D. Lepard,
The Legal Status of the 1996 Declaration on Space Benefits: Are Its Norms Now Part of
Customary International Law?, infra, 289-313.
40 Cf. further Ian Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law (7,h ed., Oxford University
Press, Oxford 2008) 6 et seq.; Rudolf Bernhardt, Customary International Law, in: Rudolf
Bernhardt (ed.), Max Planck Encyclopedia ofPublic International Law, Vol. 1 (North Holland
Publishing Company, Amsterdam et al. 1992) 898-903.
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Resolution, as a United Nations General Assembly resolution per se being non-
binding, had been accepted by 'consensus' - a concept meaning no United
Nations member State felt sufficiently 'threatened' by its principles to express
serious doubts about or objections to its text.41
Moreover, at least in the eyes of many beholders, the de facto adherence of
most relevant States to the key concepts of the resolurion - 'access [by the
sensed State] to C... )[primary data and processed data concerning the territory
under its jurisdiction] on a non-discriminatory basis and on reasonable cost
terms' and 'access to the available analysed information concerning the territory
under its jurisdiction in the possession of any State participating in remote sens-
ing activities on the same basis and terms'42 - transformed the relevant, as such
non-binding, principles into customary internationallaw.43 The present analysis
will address this particular example further below.
Reverting to general public international law for the moment, only by way of
the interrelated concepts ofjus cogens44 and obligations erga omnes45 has interna-
tionallaw been able to nibble away at the fundamental self-regulatory character
of public international law as viewed from a narrowly legalistic perspective. The
essential element of these concepts for the present purpose is that States which
have persistently refused to ratify relevant treaties and whose State practice and
opinio juris clearly go against relevant perceived rules of customary international
law are also still bound to a rule once it has achieved the elevated status of a rule
ofjus cogens and an obligation erga omnes. The classroom example is of course the
41 See on the concept of 'consensus' e.g. Erik Suy, Consensus, in: Bernhardt, ibid., 759-60.
42 Principle XII Principles Relating to Remote Sensing of the Earth from Outer Space.
4.3 Interestingly, by way of a side note, this then also lead to a discussion as to whether to trans-
form the Principles into a proper treaty - as its main contents had already become binding by
now anyway, and the original resistance against a treaty should consequently have disappeared
- or simply leave them as is - since they were already binding anyway.
44 See Arts. 5.3, 64, Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Vienna, done 2.3 May 1969,
entered into force 27 January 1980; 1155 UNTS .3.31; UKTS 1980 No. 58; Cmnd. 4818;
ATS 1974 No.2; 8 ILM 679 (1969); Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Actioities in
and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v United States of America), Judgment of 27 June 1986,
leI Reports 1986, 14, 90~91 ; also Freeland, supra, at 2.3, fn 50; Jochen Frowein, Jus eogens,
in: Rudolf Bernhardt, Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law, Vol. 3 (North
Holland Publishing Company, Amsterdam et al. 1997) 65.
45 See Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited (Belgium v Spain), Judgment of 5
February 1970. IC] Reports 1970,3, 32; see further Ram Jakhu, Legal Issues Relating to the
Global Public Interest in Outer Space. 32 Journal of Space Law (2006) 31, .39; Frowein, supra
fn 44, 66-67.
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apartheid-era South Atfica46 - but the threshold for a rule to reach the necessary
status is very high. 47
In terms of space law, though efforts have from time to time surfaced to estab-
lish such an elevated normative status for example with respect to the 'common
heritage of mankind' concept or the right of remotely sensed States to control
the generation and distribution of data regarding their respective territories, the
absence of a large consenting majority across various groups of nations - usu-
ally seen as necessary for fulfilling the requirement of acceptance and recognition
by 'the international community of States as a whole'48 - has caused such ef-
forts to fail throughout.
Other than generally acknowledged prohibitions of such international crimes
as aggression against sovereign States, genocide and racism, which also apply
to outer space and space activities, space law does not know of any specific in-
stances ofjus cogens respectively obligations erga omnes - meaning, essentially,
that unless a specific State's ratification of a relevant treaty can be shown or its
relevant State practice and accompanying opinio juris can be discerned, that State
maintains its fundamental sovereign discretion in choosing whether to adhere or
not to a specific presumed rule of space law.
Of course, the above has so far steered clear of the discussion on the specific
concept of 'soft law'; it is submitted, however, that it serves as a necessary or at
least helpful preliminary analysis to that particular discussion as it highlights the
general tendency of space lawyers to prefer clear legal guidance by way of 'hard'
law over the various legal complexities and uncertainties inherent in applying a
concept such as 'soft law'. This brings us back to the general character and per-
ceived role of law in general in the first place, before finally addressing the issue
of soft law in the context of space law and space activities.
46 See e.g. Jost Delbriick, Apartheid, in: Bern hardt, SUprtl fn 40, 193-194, and literature quoted
there.
47 Cf. Art. 53 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, which requires such a norm to be 'ac-
cepted and recognized by the international community of States as a whole as a norm from
which no derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of
general international law having the same character'; also Art. 19 ILC Draft Articles on State
Responsibility, Yearbook of the ILC (1980 II, 2), 32, on 'international crimes'.
48 Art. 53 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties; supra, fn 47.
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III. The role of' law' per se in the context of space activities
Law has been referred to above as a social construct for helping a society of hu-
mans to hold together. This, it is submitted, in very general terms also consti-
tutes the cause of space law to be furthered inter alia by the present analysis. Of
course, in the context of public international law, the 'society' at issue is the in-
ternational community, and as this has historically developed, the legal construct
of the (sovereign) 'State' essentially worked by grouping the humans concerned
together in a manner considered necessary for a feasible international legal order.
Also in this context, however, the general aim and role of 'the law' is generally
given shape along two alternative, sometimes even conflicting lines.
The first line is what one might call 'legal morality'. Whether such a goal is ac-
tually achieved at any given point in time may be largely a matter of perception,
but the law is usually expected to mirror (at least essentially and largely) some
form of 'justice' in the moral and ethical sense of the word, and perceptions of
what is right respectively wrong in the society at hand. A piece oflaw that is con-
sidered fundamentally unjust by a majority of members of the relevant society is
not destined for longevity.
This holds true even more for international space law as a branch of public
international law in view of its self-regulatory character. In the absence of le-
gitimacy in the eyes of most States, in particular space-faring ones, any effort to
establish a new rule of space law will of necessity be stillborn, as these States will
simply refuse to adhere to any treaties giving expression to such a rule and/or to
behave in any manner allowing for the label of 'customary international legal
obligation' to be stuck on it. The Moon Agreement's fate is the obvious space
law-example thereof.
From the same perspective therefore, the whole discussion on the 'common
heritage of mankind', referenced above, abounds with moral and ethical claims
that the developing nations should not be deprived of any possibility to enjoy
the benefits of outer space activities - notably, in this case, mineral and other
resources of the Moon and other celestial bodies - merely because their tech-
nological and financial development is lagging behind that of 'more fortunate'
States.49 Application of the 'common heritage of mankind' principle was aimed
49 The same 'morality' and ethical considerations were behind the broad concept of the 'New
International Economic Order' which gained prominence in the years immediately before the
Moon Agreemenr started ro be drafted and was most explicitly given expression by means of
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at redressing those inequalities by mandatory revenue-sharing and technology
transfers.
Also the ultimate denial of world-wide acceptability of the concept was often
dressed in moral terms. Apart from stifling any interest in trying to harvest those
celestial resources (a more practical argument), it was simply considered immoral
by many to force those willing to take the risks and pay the price to try and har-
vest celestial resources to share any possible - but certainly not guaranteed -
revenues or other benefits with those who had not undertaken any effort in that
direction whatsoever.
International law, including space law, has always tried to properly incorpo-
rate such considerations in more formally-legal discussions through concepts like
'equity'50 and 'ex aequo et bono'.51
Similarly, in the debate on the applicability of Resolution 41165's principles
on remote sensing as legal obligations, essentially moral claims regarding the
inherent right of a State to receive any information regarding its own territory
acquired by other States or entities had to be balanced with the essentially moral
claims that States which spent huge efforts and took large risks in developing,
launching and operating remote sensing satellites could not be forced to simply
share any resulting data with others who did not employ such efforts or take
such risks. 52
The above also brings us'to the second line along which to achieve law's aims
in terms of organising society, of what one might call 'legal practicality'. What-
ever law results from the law-generating processes at issue, it should be practical
at least to a certain level- meaning that it should be understandable to the sub-
jects at issue and be not overly complicated. Even more importantly and funda-
mentally, however, practicality requires that the law provides for a maximum of
predictability of the behaviour of the other subjects of the law - in the case of
international (space) law: States, as the predominant legal actors and personali-
the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, GA Res. 3281 (XXIX) of 12 December
1974; United Nations Doc. A/I9631. The 'common heritage of mankind' concept as elabo-
rated in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (see supra, fn 36) constituted
one of the most explicit manifestations of that thinking.
50 Cf e.g. Art. XII Liability Convention, on how to determine the appropriate compensation for
damage caused by a space object.
51 As already referenced in Art. 38 (2) ICJ Statute.
52 Cf. rhe phrasing of Principles II-VI, XII, Xlll Principles Relating to Remote Sensing of the
Earth from Outer Space.
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ties grouping together actual humans - in the society at issue. Law thus has an
innate tendency towards stability - in positive terms - alternatively immobil-
ity and inflexibility - in more negative terms.
Part of such predictability furthermore lies in the simple fact that 'law' em-
braces its own relative immobility by including specific, by nature somewhat
laborious, even occasionally bureaucratic processes which ensure that law cannot
be changed at a whim or otherwise instantly - otherwise, we call it 'revolution'.
Thus, most treaties, including the space law treaties, explicitly provide for their
own mechanisms for changing the substance of their legal regimes. 53
The practical element in the discussions regarding the 'common heritage of
mankind' and 'non-discriminatory access' to remote sensing data has already
been referred to, but in those cases the practical element is at least very much
intertwined with the moral one (certainly on one side of the argument). Many
more legal rules, of course, are practical without further ado - there is no inher-
ent 'justice' in driving on the right side of the road as opposed to driving on the
left side (as British, Indians and some others are no doubt keen to assert), but
one way or another a choice has to be made in order for traffic not to result in
immediate chaos and destruction.
Also in space law a number of rules are predominantly or exclusively driven
by such practicality concerns, especially as 'outer space' is becoming ever less a
realm where only States can really be active. From the details of the registration
parameters to be provided for purposes of the international register of space ob-
jects launched into outer space key to the involvement of the United Nations
therein,54 the applicable provisions of the Registration Convention do not have
much to do with 'justice' or an inherent moral superiority of the United Nations
but everything with practical considerations.
To quote another example, also the current regime for handling international
liability resulting from space activities, focused on the concept of the 'launching
State' of a space object as the State(s) fundamentally involved in the launch of a
space object causing damage, was to a large extent driven by practical considera-
tions. Notably the State whose territory and/or facility was used for the launch of
the space object at issue55 would always be easy to identify, and hence allowed for
53 See e.g. on amendments Art. XV Outer Space Treaty; Art. 8 Rescue Agreement; Art. XXV
Liability Convention; Art. IX Registration Convention; and Art. 17 Moon Agreement.
54 Cf. Arts. III, IV Registration Convention.
55 Cf. Art. I (c) sub Oi) Liability Convention; also Art. Vll Liability Convention.
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easy addressing of relevant claims of liability. Now that these considerations, in
particular with a view to private operators actually in control of sarellite operations,
seem to lose much of their practicality, many experts start expressing doubts about
the continuing viability and workability of this system for allocating liability.
These two rationales which are basically behind all law result already in in-
herent tensions and, certainly in space law, the self-regulatory character allows
States by and large to strive for their own individual balance in terms of the legal
regime they would feel comfortable adhering to. Whereas changed perceptions
of justice, morality and ethics regularly call for adaptation of law, the law itself
has in-built resistances to change as part of its practical usability: the more it
takes to change existing law, the more predictable the behaviour of its subjects
continues to be. At the same time, this may, in turbulent times in particular,
cause the law to considerably lag behind moral and ethical developments (not
to mention political, economic and social developments), sometimes even fun-
damentally calling into question the raison d'hre of law. Those times often are
also those when efforts to bring 'soft law' to the fore are most prominent, trying
to circumvent 'hard' law's innate immobility in presenting essentially non-legal
constructs as 'soft law' and thus endowing them with some legal meaning one
way or another.
This brings the meta-legal analysis to a final important aspect, which in the
context of space law is even more dominant than it is in general public inter-
national law in view of the omnipresent military and dual-use aspects of space
activities. This relates to the character of the international community as often
turning into an international arena, where States are always dedicated most to
their very own survival or at least general well-being in that area.
In terms of adhering to international law, whether by ratifying treaties or by
being seen to accept customary international law - more often perhaps for the
sake of predictability than that of justice - this leads to another major inherent
tension. States are often - certainly on the key issues playing in the interna-
tional community - somehow looking to limit the freedom of action of those
other States considered particularly threatening to their own survival and well-
being, whilst keeping maximum freedom for themselves and States considered
friends or allies. Finding the optimum balance here is the basic driver for foreign
ministries and departments, when entering any relevant treaty negotiations, in
pushing for specific treaty obligations to be drafted. 56
56 An interesting example concerns Art. IV Outer Space Treaty, which precludes the stationing of
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This may also cause States in general to be rather careful in adhering to spe-
cific treaties, as these are more precise and leave less room for bona fide discre-
tion in undertaking certain activities. In particular in such a rapidly developing
area as space activities - in political, economic, but certainly also technological
terms - States would prefer not to bind themselves at the outset to such precise
systems of legal rules, being weary of the chance that unexpected consequences
of such adherence might arise.
The consequently larger role of customary international law in this context
- or, perhaps more accurately, the larger tendency for States confronted with a
legal issue and legal experts to look for customary law in the absence of applica-
ble treaty law - certainly contributes to the aforementioned perception of im-
maturity of international (space) law, but also causes the discussion on the role
of 'soft law' (past, present and future) to be more prominent and less theoretical
in this context.
IV. 'Soft law' and space activities: a qualified plea
Against the backdrop of the foregoing, finally, it is indeed possible to address the
issue of 'soft law' in the context of space activities from a rather different angle.
It may now be asserted, for example, that much of this discussion on 'soft law'
concentrates on the seeming internal contradiction between 'law', which pre-
supposes binding ('hard') rules of behaviour not subject to the own discretion
of the law's subject, and 'soft', which seems to refer to political, social or moral
requirements not expressed in legal terms and hence allowing for precisely such
discretion in applying relevant 'rules'.
Those who do not accept the concept of 'soft law' usually argue along the lines
of 'one cannot be just a little pregnant; either one is pregnant, or one is not pregnant'
- meaning that either something is 'law', in which case it is binding ('hard'),
or it is 'soft', in which case it may be a number of different things but certainly
not 'law'.
weapons of mass destruction in outer space - but a contrario allows for using outer space as a
trajectory for weapons of mass destruction as well as stationing weapons not of mass destruc-
tion, simply because neither the United States nor the USSR at the time (a) wanted to limit
their own options with respect to the latter two military uses of outer space; (b) were them-
selves planning using outer space as a 'station' for weapons of mass destruction; or (c) would
like to provide the other party with the legal freedom to start doing so.
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Firstly, here, the distinction between a formal and a substantive analysis of the
issue of 'soft law' needs to be taken into account - and sometimes seems lost in
the argumentation. Under the former analysis, 'law' is everything encompassed
in documents considered to bind a certain group of subjects (read: treaties),
whereas 'non-law' is by contrast everything contained in documents considered
not to be formally - legally - binding (read, for example, United Nations
General Assembly resolutions).
Under the latter analysis, the measure oflegally binding force of a provision is
determined by the substance of that provision. In expert discussions, this is often
summarised with reference to the dichotomy between 'shall' - which clearly
points to a legally binding obligation - and 'should' or 'may' - where the issue
becomes considerably more complicated. And unfortunately, the use of ,shall' is
not exclusive to formally legally binding documents, or the use of 'should' and
'may' to formally non-binding documents.
If a treaty, clearly per se a binding legal document under a formal analysis, uses
the wording 'should' or 'may' instead of 'shall', 57 the result is still a legal obliga-
tion, yet in substance it contains more of an exhortation than a legal obligation
- it seems rather convoluted to 'oblige' someone 'to be allowed' to undertake
certain activities.
This is, however, what repeatedly is at issue in the case of the space law trea-
ties. Consider, for example Article 1(b) of the Rescue Agreement providing that
'the Secretary-General of the United Nations [... ] should disseminate [... ] [rel-
evant] information' concerning spacecraft accidents',58 or Article 4 of the Moon
Agreement providing '[i]nternational cooperation in pursuance of this Agree-
ment should be as wide as possible and may take place on a multilateral basis, on
a bilateral basis or through international intergovernmental organizations'. 59 In
legal discussions such (apparent?) inherent contradictions are usually referred to
as 'obligations of effort' (as opposed to 'obligations of result'), at least if they ap-
pear in documents legally binding per se (following the formal analysis).
However, ultimately there is no escaping from the question: is this, then, law
or not? Under the formal approach it is, but since it is rather difficult to deter-
mine objectively for example the real level and sincerity of any 'effort' in this
57 Cf. e.g. Art. IV (2) Registration Convention: 'Each State of registry may, from time to time,
provide the Secretary-General of the Unired Nations with additional information concerning
a space object carried on its registry.' (emphasis added.)
58 Art. 1 (b) Rescue Agreement (emphasis added).
59 Art. 4 Moon Agreement (emphasis added).
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context, is it in substance not a rather 'soft' rule? Should it, then, be labelled 'soft
law' or 'hard law'? Is it possible after all that there is something in between 'law'
and 'non-law', where 'hard' treaty law sometimes contains elements of what at
least feels like 'soft law', as it allows States a lot of discretion in actually interpret-
ing substance and extent of the 'obligation' at issue?
Similar arguments could be advanced when the terms of a treaty are, on pur-
pose or not, so vague as not to provide much guidance as to what the 'hard' ob-
ligation actually means. Treaties properly ratified and having entered into force
are of course binding upon the States concerned as 'hard law', but what if they
provide for obligations too general or too vague to be useful in any particular
dispute? Consider for example the Outer Space Treaty's provision that' [i) n the
exploration and use of outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bod-
ies, States Parties to the Treaty shall be guided by the principle of cooperation and
mutual assistance'.6o
Or, following a very fundamental tenet of space law, '[ tJ he Moon and other
celestial bodies shall be used by all States Parties to the Treaty exclusively for
peaceful purposes'6l - yet it is common knowledge that this provision has for
a long time been interpreted rather differently by the two major space powers.62
And what does 'to the greatest extent feasible and practicable' mean, when juxta-
posed to a formal and formally phrased obligation in the context of the provision
of information on potentially hazardous space activities ?63
Another key clause of the 1967 Outer Space Treaty formally requires that
States 'shall carryon activities in the exploration and use of outer space [... J in
60 Art. IX Outer Space Treaty (emphasis added).
61 An. IV, 2"d sentence Outer Space Tteaty (emphasis added).
62 Whilst the USSR insisted throughout its existence that 'exclusively peaceful purposes' would
exclude any military activity in outer space unless specifically allowed by another provision of
space law, the United States has consistently advocated that military uses of outer space were
allowed as long as of a defensive nature. See e.g. Gennady Zhukov and Yuri Kolosov, Inter-
national Space Law (Praeger Publishers, New York 1984) 53-61 ; Carl Christol, 77Je Modern
International Law of Outer Space (Pergamon Press, New York 1982) 22-37; Carl Christol,
TI,e Common Interest in the Exploration, Use and Exploitation of Outer Space for Peaceful
Purposes: "The Soviet-American Dilemma, Proceedings of the 27'" Colloquium on the Law of
Outer Space (1985) 282-284; Bin Cheng, Studies in International Space Law (Oxford Univer-
sity Press, Oxford 1997) 513-522; Paul Dembling and Daniel Arons, The Evolution of the
Outer Space Treaty, 33 Journal of Air Law and Commetce (1%7) 434-435.
63 E.g. An. Xl, Outer Space Treaty. Cf. also e.g. Art. [V(3) Registration Convention, which pta-
vides fot almost identical language in respect of a certain obligation to provide information on
space objects launched into outer space.
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the interest ofmaintaining international peace and security and promoting in-
ternational cooperation and understanding', 64 and this has been claimed ever
since its inception by many States and experts to actually provide for a clear-cut
obligation to cooperate internationally.65 Yet, the nature of international coopera-
tion, whether one looks at the non-legal realities of the international community
at at the realities of how general international law has dealt with international
cooperation would not allow any State to force another State to 'cooperate' by
pointing at such a presumed legal obligation. In the end, it took the 1996 Reso-
lution 51/122 to provide some clarity and guidance regarding the actual con-
tents, scope and extent of this 'obligation of effort'.
Also examples the other way around can be found in space law. Resolution
41/65 on remote sensing for example provides that '[rJemote sensing activities
shall be carried out for the benefit and in the interests of all countries, irrespec-
tive of their degree of economic, social or scientific and technological develop-
ment, and taking into particular consideration the needs of the developing coun-
tries', 'shall be conducted in accordance with international law' and 'shall be
conducted in accordance with the principles contained in article l' of the Outer
Space Treaty. 66 The phrase 'shall' normally being considered to refer to a 'hard',
legal obligation, of course the United Nations General Assembly does not have
any such competence per se to have a resolution provide for such binding, 'hard'
law.
In many such circumstances, then, reference needs to be made to State prac-
tice and opinio juris to try and discern a more or less coherent customary rule of
international law, 'filling in' as it were the lack of precision of the treaty terms or,
alternatively, the lack of innate binding force of guidelines and principles such as
contained in United Nations General Assembly resolutions.
Not that this always results in clarity regarding the extent of the legal obliga-
tion at issue: certainly with regard to the aforementioned obligations regarding
64 Art. 1II Outer Space Treaty (emphasis added).
65 C£ e.g. Zhukov and Kolosov, supra fn 62, 75 et seq.; Sandeepa Bhat, Law and Space research,
in: Sandeepa Bhat (ed.), Space Law in the Era ofCommercir;/isation (Easrern Book Company,
Lucknow 2010) 7, calling it a 'grundnorm'; to some extent Jose Monserrat Filho, The Im-
portance of International Cooperation in Building National Space data Infrastructure in All
Counrries, Proceedings of the 49,h Colloquium on the Law of Ourer Space (2007) esp. 228-
229; also Vladlen Vereshchetin, fn 2, 6, linking it to the 1996 Resolution.
66 Principles II, Ill, IV Principles Relating to Remote Sensing of the Earth from Ourer Space,
respectively (emphasis added).
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the provision of information undet the Registration Convention,67 State practice
shows a wide disparity in the extent States have consideted it 'feasible and prac-
ticable' to register satellites in accordance with these provisions - or even ap-
parently considered it not to be 'feasible and practicable' at all to register them. 68
Another notorious example concerns Resolution 41/65, where the key provi-
sion on 'non-discriminatory access' of a sensed State concerning data regarding
its territory69 has been argued rather widely to have evolved into a rule of cus-
tomary law - the reference in many leading national space laws and policies
concerning the handling of remote sensing data being used as decisive evidence
of State practice and opinio juris.?o However, upon closer view it appears that,
whilst indeed referencing in most cases Principle XII of the resolution which is
at issue here, the individual legislators and policy makers proceeded with giving
that Principle their own, peculiar interpretation. In many cases, such interpreta-
tions still allow for 'discrimination' (a) between those who contributed to the
satellite system generating the remote sensing data and those who did not, and
(b) between non-commercial and commercial users (however defined); and/or
(c) between those using the data for specific purposes (again, however defined).?]
What, then, is the meaning or even value of customary legal status of the phrase
'non-discriminatory access' if one level down it turns out to be interpreted in
widely different fashion?
Moreover, it should be reiterated that customary international law itself is
not a clear-cut phenomenon either. Whereas a treaty becomes binding from one
moment to the other - by its entry into force in general, or for a particular
State upon its ratification or adherence - a customary rule of international law
usually arises gradually, moving on a 'gliding' scale from 'no State practice and/
or opinio juris' to 'sufficient State practice and opinio juris' to be accepted as
customary law by (a majority of) relevant States and legal experts. As a conse-
67 As per Art. IV Registration Convention, in particular.
68 See e.g. Yoon Lee, Registration of space objects; ESA member states' practice, 22 Space Policy
(2006) 42, 44.
69 As per Principle XII Principles Relating to Remote Sensing of the Earth from Outer Space.
70 See e.g. Joanne Gabrynowicz, Defining Data Availability for Commercial Remote Sensing
Sysrems, XXIII Annals of Air and Space Law (1998) 95-96; for a more comprehensive analy-
sis of the legal status see Atsuyo Ito, Legal Aspects ofSatellite Remote Sensing (Brill Academic
Publishers, Leiden et ai. 2011) 45-66.
71 Cf. for a more extensive comparative analysis the author's Non-discriminatory data dissemi-
nation in practice, in: Ray Harris (ed.), Earth Observation Data Policy and Europe (Swets &
Zeitlinger B.Y., Lisse 2002) 41-50.
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quence, contrary to treaty law, it is almost never possible to pinpoint an exact
moment when the rubycon between 'no customary law' and 'customary law'
is crossed - rather, there is a 'soft' marsh of some width in between two 'hard'
shores.
Therefore, in the discussion on 'soft law', too often it seems to be overlooked
that 'law' not only represents a given status, a snapshot at a given moment of
what is allowed and what is not, but also (certainly at the international level,
which is also where space law largely originates) refers to a process of arriving at
such a snapshot at any given time. In other words, there are different gradations
of 'pregnancy', which after all starts from an infinitesimally small element to
wind up with a full-blown living being - which then continues to grow old and
transform itself throughout its life.
It is in the context of such processes that any concept of 'soft law' should best
be analysed and discussed as to its value, in particular also in the area of space
law where international treaties - the instruments most clearly transforming
'non-law' into 'hard law' from one moment to the other - are relatively rare.
Customary international law, by contrast and by definition, is very much a grad-
ual process, where 'non-law' only over time, subject to analysis, interpretation
and in particular the accumulation of State practice and opinio juris, evolves into
'hard law'.
If that means that somewhere along the road, read when the resolution as a
non-legally binding document starts to give rise to some consistent and relevant
State practice and opinio juris but has not yet been labelled customary interna-
tionallaw so as to be accepted as binding law in substance, States start to feel
comfortable and trusting, there would indeed be considerable benefit from 'soft
law', whether in the context of customary international law or (interpretation
of) treaty law - and indeed, thereby it plays an indispensable function in the
development of a proper international space law framework.
This is where Realpolitik should come into play with a view to furthering as
best as possible the cause of space law in the context of the international com-
munity of space-faring and non-space-faring States. Here, 'the best' - aiming
straight for a treaty, the most clear and coherent source of international space
law - would often turn out to be the enemy of 'the good' - realising a process
rather than an immediate result. That process would allow States, hesitant at
the outset to commit to such clear-cut treaty obligations, to start out accepting
merely political 'obligations' which are not yet fully elaborated and/or not legally
binding, such as by way of an United Nations General Assembly resolution, to
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gradually lose their cold feet in getting acquainted with the way such obliga-
tions turn out to affect their interests (especially in the context of rapid new
technical or political developments), to adjust as necessary domestic institutions,
procedures and practices, to guide further international developments concern-
ing those obligations following increased insight, and to start trusting that other
States are doing the same. Ultimately, then, this should (hopefully) reach a level
of maturity of understanding of the issues and of other States' interests which
would allow for a really binding legal regime, coherent and feasible - probably
more so than if a treaty had been forthwith concluded.
As a matter of fact, present-day space law has provided us with a very interest-
ing example of this process - in the field of space debris and efforts to mitigate
its generation and deleterious consequences. The process started on a completely
non-legal level, with major space agencies in the context of the Inter-Agency
Space Debris Coordination Committee (lADC) agreeing in 2002 on a political!
practical level to essentially start conducting their respective space operations in
a manner less conducive to the generation of harmful space debris.?2 As a next
step, the United Nations, almost as the official representative of the international
community of States but of course still without binding legal effect, by officially
recognising the validity and value of the lADC document in a United Nations
General Assembly resolution of 2007 elevated these practical guidelines to what
should probably be called - certainly at that time - a 'soft law' status.?l
Currently, however, by way of a third phase, a number of States involved have
in addition chosen to start applying relevant aspects of those guidelines as license
requirements for private space operators74 - in other words, albeit on a domes-
tic level so far, without question as legally binding obligations. This, if nothing
72 This ulrimarely resulred in rhe IADC Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines, IADC-02-0 1. Revi-
sion 1, September 2007.
73 As per Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines of the United Nations Committee on the Peace-
ful Uses of Outer Space (A/62/20) endorsed by General Assembly Resolution 62/217 of 21
December 2007; A/RES/62/217.
74 Notably, in France, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom and the United States; Lotta Viikari,
7he Environmental Element in Space Law (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Leiden et aL 2008)
96; Toshio Kosuge and Yu Takeuchi, From Guideline ro International ]reaty for Rule of Law
Concerning Mitigation of Space Debris?, Proceedings of the International Institute of Space
Law 2010 (201l) 291-298, discuss from this perspective also Russia, China and India, as well
as the European Space Agency as far as their own (inter)governmentallaunches are concerned;
further e.g. Kelly Gable, Rules Regarding Space Debris; Preventing a Tragedy of the Com-
mons, Proceedings of the 50'10 Colloquium on the Law of Outer Space (2008) 262.
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else, reflects a willingness on the side of those States to impose extra burdens and
costs on their own entities competing in the international arena, without any
international law guaranteeing a level playing field - by requiring that all other
States in the same position are doing the same.
If, some years along the road, not only the space debris problem will have
gained enough urgency in the perception of the key space-faring States but also
the appropriate legal and other regulatory techniques will have been discovered
or developed for States to feel certain about the sustainability and appropriate-
ness of the balance between the various concerns at stake, it may well be that an
international treaty on the issue ceases to be beyond reach.
A next candidate for a similar development might be the use of remote sens-
ing data for disaster mitigation and management. Since 1999, a number of ma-
jor space agencies agreed on a Charter on Space and Major Disasters7) which
essentially developed a loose institutional arrangement for States threatened or
victimised by natural or man-made disasters to gain rapid access to free satellite
data which might help them in averting or mitigating such disasters. Whilst the
Charter does not provide any 'normal' legal obligations, and for example clearly
disclaims any liability of the data provider in case of damage caused in the con-
text of use of such data, it is clear that several issues, such as intellectual property
rights regarding the data and national security issues, will repeatedly turn up and
ultimately require legal solutions.
Since at the same time the Charter has turned out to be hugely successful
(with more than 300 invocations till the present day, from all over the world76) a
considerable interest might be developing within the international community
to gradually transform this 'soft law' regime into a more clear-cut and legally
binding regime - once the providers in particular have gained enough experi-
ence with the Charter's realities to feel confident regarding the obligations they
would be willing to accept. In order to allow them to do that, however, the cur-
rent Charter operations should not now be disregarded or put aside as merely
constituting 'soft law' - whilst, of course, acting as if they were already provid-
ing for 'hard' law obligations would be counterproductive as well.
75 See Charter On Cooperation To Achieve The Coordinated Use Of Space Facilities In The
Event Of Natural Or Technological Disasters; http://www.disasterscharter.org/main_e.html
(23/08/2011); also Atsuyo Ito, Legal Aspects of the International Charter on Space and Major
Disasters, Proceedings of the 47,h Colloquium on the Law of Outer Space (2005) 233-241.
76 See http://www.esa.int/esaEO/SEML7PYOBFC_index_0.html (23/08/2011).
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Thus, it is finally submitted that, while never losing sight of the benefits of a
clear and coherent legal framework probably still best reflected through a treaty
regime, in the arena of space activities there is considerable benefit from such
mechanisms usually labelled 'soft law', whether in the context of customary in-
ternationallaw or of treaty law. Indeed, they may in a number of occasions have
an indispensable function in the development of a proper international space law
framework for such activities. Whether one should continue to call them 'soft
law', ultimately is ofless relevance.
